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Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism Together? The Influence of 
the United Nations on the European 
Union’s Financial Sanctions Regime
Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert
7.1 Introduction
Since the devastating attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade 
Center, international co-operation to combat terrorism has developed sig-
nificantly both at the global and regional levels within bodies such as the 
United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) respectively (Cortright 
and Lopez, 2007; Spence, 2007; Weiss and Boulden, 2004). One of the most 
important dimensions of counter-terrorism is combating terrorist financing 
(CTF) (Acharya, 2009; Biersteker, Eckert and Romaniuk, 2008). While it has 
often been observed that the conduct of terrorist attacks does not necessar-
ily require large amounts of money, it is generally acknowledged that the 
preparation of attacks and the other activities of terrorist groups – such as 
recruitment, training, propaganda, and the promotion of terrorist causes – 
necessitate higher levels of funding (Acharya, 2009; Clunan, 2007; Richard, 
2005, 5–6). Preventing would-be terrorists from accessing funds is there-
fore a way to disrupt their activities and prevent future attacks (Gardner, 
2007, 157). Focusing on the money trail left by terrorists also allows inves-
tigators to gather evidence against terrorists and to generate intelligence 
concerning terrorist groups (Bures, 2010, 419). 
Terrorism can be funded legally or illegally (Acharya, 2009). Lawful or 
legitimate funds include money raised by charities, donations and the pro-
ceeds of other forms of fund-raising, whereas illegal funds refer to proceeds 
of criminal activities such as money-laundering, drug trafficking, and illegal 
arms trade. Such proceedings would be frozen or seized even if they were not 
destined to finance terrorism, in contrast to legal funds that can only be fro-
zen or seized if it is intended that they should finance terrorism (Bantekas, 
2003, 316).1 In addition, terrorism can be funded by states or private actors. 
As there has been a significant decrease in the number of states financing 
terrorism over the last few years, the role of private actors in the financing of 
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terrorism has become increasingly important (Bantekas, 2003, 316; Clunan, 
2007, 264). Terrorist financing can therefore be defined in broad terms, as it 
has been by the EU in the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive2 as ‘the 
provision or collection of funds, by any means, directly or indirectly, with 
the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to 
be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out any of the offences’ that have 
been defined as terrorism.3 The diversity of the actors and activities involved 
in terrorism is also reflected in the range of CTF measures, which address 
one or several phases(s) of the terrorist financing process (‘raising funds, 
holding funds, moving or transferring funds, and dispersing funds to com-
mit terrorist acts’) (Biersteker, 2004, 64; see also Acharya, 2009; European 
Parliament, 2009).
In the EU, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 have been a major 
catalyst for the development of the EU’s CTF policy, although some CTF 
measures had already been adopted previously, such as sanctions against 
Usama Bin Laden. Several scholars have commented that the EU’s CTF policy 
has been influenced to a significant degree by standards developed outside 
the EU (Bures, 2010; Heng and McDonagh, 2008). This chapter examines 
how the development of a major aspect of the EU’s CTF policy, namely 
financial sanctions (or asset freezing) measures against suspected terrorists, 
has been influenced by the UN. Financial sanctions against individuals are 
measures that oblige states to (1) freeze the funds and other financial assets 
or economic resources of the targeted persons and (2) ensure that these 
persons do not have any direct or indirect access to other funds, financial 
assets or economic resources.4 They are a category of the so-called targeted 
or smart sanctions, which have been developed since the 1990s in response 
to the acknowledgement that comprehensive sanctions placed upon states 
generally cause high levels of suffering among the population of the tar-
geted country, often without achieving their main aims (van Thiel, 2008). 
However, the move from collective sanctions (against states) to targeted 
sanctions (against individuals) has caused specific problems, such as the 
difficulty for the targeted private entities or individuals to express their disa-
greement with the imposition of sanctions (see Almqvist, 2008; Draghici, 
2009; Eeckhout, 2007; Flynn, 2007; Foot, 2007; Guild, 2008; Heupel, 2009; 
van den Herik, 2007; van den Herik and Schrijver, 2008; Vlcek, 2009). 
The focus will now be on this specific component of the EU’s CTF policy 
because of its importance in the overall EU’s CTF policy, as well as the con-
troversies that have surrounded it.5 Also, as the present book seeks to explore 
various issues pertaining to the influence of international institutions over 
the EU as explained in the introductory chapter, this case was identified as an 
interesting case after a review of the existing literature, because of the likely 
existence of at least some degree of influence of the UN over the EU.6
This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first presents the 
development of the EU’s financial sanctions regime, while the second shows 
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how it has been influenced by the UN, in particular the UN Security Council 
(UNSC). The third section examines the two main factors accounting for 
the influence of the UN over the EU in this policy area, namely a process of 
‘path-dependency’ from previous sanctions regimes and the EU’s declared 
commitment to multilateralism and international law. The next section 
highlights that, while the European Commission and the Council have 
appeared comfortable with the influence of the UN over the development 
of the EU’s financial sanctions regime, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
has attempted to reduce such influence in a recent landmark ruling. Finally, 
the chapter offers some conclusions on the issue of the influence of the UN 
over the EU.
7.2 The EU’s financial sanctions regime
Prior to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the EU had not adopted 
any specific provisions concerning the financing of terrorism. To a large 
extent, this only reflected the lack of development of its counter-terror-
ism policy more generally, which ‘was more political than operational’ 
(Romaniuk, 2010, 113). In that respect, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 
2001 can be seen as a ‘critical juncture’ that led to a significant increase in 
EU co-operation on counterterrorism (Argomaniz, 2009; see also Kaunert, 
2007; 2010a; 2010b; Kaunert and Della Giovanna, 2010; Peers, 2003). At 
the extraordinary European Council of 21 September 2001, terrorism was 
identified as one of the main challenges facing Europe and the world and, 
conversely, the fight against terrorism was defined as one of the EU’s prior-
ity objectives. The action plan adopted on that occasion defined combating 
the funding of terrorism as a ‘decisive aspect’ and one of the five priorities 
of the EU’s counterterrorism policy (European Council, 2001a, 2). More 
precisely, it called upon the ECOFIN and Justice and Home Affairs Councils 
to adopt the measures necessary to combat terrorist financing (European 
Council, 2001a, 2). The Action Plan also highlighted the importance 
for all member states to sign and ratify ‘as a matter of urgency’ the UN 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Among the 
46 measures identified in the Anti-Terrorism Roadmap that was adopted on 
26 September 2001, two concerned terrorist financing (European Council, 
2001b).7 Combating terrorist financing (‘to reduce the access of terrorists to 
financial and economic resources’) was also identified as one of the seven 
‘New Strategic Objectives’ in the combat against terrorism endorsed by the 
European Council and annexed to the Declaration on Terrorism adopted 
on 25 March 2004 (European Council, 2004). The 2004 EU Action Plan 
on Combating Terrorism also identified reducing the access of terrorists to 
financial and other economic resources as one of seven objectives of the 
EU’s counter-terrorism policy (Council, 2004b). In order to organize more 
systematically activities in this policy area, a Strategy on combating the 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
9780230314481_08_cha07.indd   113 12/26/2011   11:08:13 AM
PROOF
114  Combating the Financing of Terrorism Together?
financing of terrorism was adopted by the European Council in December 
2004, before being substantially revised in July 2008 (Council, 2005a; 
Council, 2008). The EU instruments aiming to limit terrorists’ access to 
financial and other economic resources are an important component of the 
so-called ‘Pursue’ strand of the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy of December 
2005 (Council, 2005b).8 
As previously mentioned, this chapter focuses on one of the main dimen-
sions of the EU’s CTF policy, namely financial sanctions against individuals 
suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. Before examining the evolu-
tion of the EU’s financial sanctions regime, it is important to note that one of 
its main characteristics is its legal complexity. Until the Treaty of Lisbon came 
into force on 1 December 2009, one could have referred to the ‘cross-pillar’ 
character of this regime, as it involved various measures in the three pillars of 
the EU.9 First of all, a common position was adopted under Articles 15 and 34 
of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) to set the EU’s general approach on 
the matter. It contained measures relating to foreign policy – such as the ‘stra-
tegic decision’ to adopt individual sanctions (Eckes, 2009, 44) – and police 
and judicial criminal matters – such as assistance in preventing and combat-
ing terrorist acts – that is, measures in the (now former) second and third 
pillars. Subsequently, a regulation instructing the European Community (EC) 
to implement the necessary operational measures was adopted in the (now 
former) first (EC) pillar. The measures discussed in this chapter were adopted 
under this institutional arrangement. As the Treaty of Lisbon has now abol-
ished the three-pillar structure of the EU, it is no longer correct to describe 
EU asset freezing measures as ‘cross-pillar’ instruments, although those have 
remained rather complex from a legal standpoint.
With regard to its content, the EU’s financial sanctions regime has two 
main components. The first comprises the measures that have been adopted 
to freeze the assets of the Taliban, Usama Bin Laden and his associates (i.e., 
Al Qaeda) in particular. The second relates to broader measures that provide 
for the freezing of the assets of individual terrorists and entities in general. 
The first asset freezing measures adopted by the EU were of the first type; 
they targeted the Taliban (Council Common Position 1999/727/CFSP of 15 
November 1999) and Usama Bin Laden and the persons and entities associ-
ated with him (Council Common Position 2001/154/CFSP of 26 February 
2001, repealed by Council Common Position 2002/402/CFSP of 27 May 
2002) (Tappeiner, 2005, 103). As explained earlier, the EU asset freezing 
measures were two-tiered as they were based on both common positions and 
regulations. Thus, regarding the restrictive measures against the Taliban, 
Council Common Position 1999/727/CFSP was supplemented by Council 
Regulation EC 337/2000. The latter was replaced by Regulation EC 467/2001 
once Common Position 2001/154/CFSP was adopted.
After adopting measures targeting the Taliban, Bin Laden and his 
 associates in particular, the EU later adopted broader financial sanctions 
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 targeting  terrorists in general. In December 2001, the Council adopted a 
major package of four items, comprising two common positions, a regula-
tion implementing the Community law aspects of the foreign policy part 
of one of the common positions, as well as a decision further implement-
ing that regulation. Council Common Position on combating terrorism 
(2001/930/CFSP) outlined a series of actions to be taken by the EU to com-
bat terrorism, including the freezing of the funds and other financial assets 
and economic resources of individuals and groups facilitating, attempting 
to commit or committing terrorist acts on the territory of the EU. Council 
Common Position 2001/931/CFSP contained more specific measures to 
combat terrorism. More precisely, it provided that, pursuant to Community 
law, the EC should order the freezing of the funds and other financial assets 
or economic resources of ‘international’ (i.e., non-EU) terrorists and ensure 
that those would not have access to alternative funds, financial assets, eco-
nomic resources or financial or related services. This instrument also con-
tained a definition of ‘persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts’, 
which was identical to that outlined in the Council Framework Decision of 
13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, although the latter instrument had 
not been adopted following parliamentary reservations. In addition, Council 
Common Position 2001/931/CFSP required member states to strengthen 
judicial and police co-operation with respect to both ‘international’ and 
‘domestic’ (i.e., EU) terrorists. There was an annex to this common position, 
which listed the persons, groups and entities ‘involved in terrorist acts’ who 
were targeted. This first version contained 29 persons and 13 groups and 
entities. This common position indicated that the list would be reviewed 
regularly and at least once every six months. As for the connected regulation 
(Council Regulation EC 2580/2001), it defined the ‘funds’ and assets to be 
frozen and laid down a detailed freezing procedure, while the decision con-
nected to this regulation (Council Decision 2001/927/EC of 27 December 
2001) listed the persons, groups and entities to which the aforementioned 
regulation applied. This first version of the list contained ten entries (eight 
individuals and two groups). Since then, it has been amended several times. 
Its most recent version at the time of writing contained 25 individuals and 
29 groups and entities.10
It is important to note that the question of whether the Council had the 
competence to adopt these regulations – and thereby to develop and imple-
ment the EC policy against the financing of terrorism in practice – has been 
highly controversial. The Council based the regulations on Articles 60, 301 
and 308 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). In the 
past, the Council had already adopted regulations containing sanctions tar-
geting individual persons and entities on the basis of Articles 60 and 301. 
However, these sanctions only targeted persons holding official positions 
within the structure of a specific state, as well as their associates, such as the 
sanctions imposed by the EU upon Slobodan Milosevicˇ and his family in the 
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late 1990s. Article 301 stipulated that the Council could ‘take the necessary 
urgent measures’ when ‘it [was] provided, in a Common Position (…) for 
an action by the Community to interrupt or reduce (…) economic relations 
with one or more third countries’. Article 60 stated that ‘in cases envisaged 
in Article 301 (…) the Council may in accordance with the procedure pro-
vided for in Article 301, take the necessary urgent measures in the move-
ment of capital and in payments as regards the third countries concerned’. 
In the case of the asset freezing regulations under scrutiny in this chapter, 
the Council decided to supplement Articles 60 and 301 with Article 308 in 
order to be able to adopt sanctions against ‘ordinary’ individuals who did 
not necessarily hold any official position in a given country. Article 308 ena-
bled the Council to take the appropriate measures to ‘attain, in the course of 
the common market, one of the objectives of the Community’ in any case 
where ‘the Treaty [had] not provided the necessary powers’. 
However, several scholars have criticized this reasoning and have argued 
that even a combined reading of these three articles did not give the EC the 
competence to adopt these asset freezing regulations. It is generally agreed 
that Articles 301 TEC and 60 TEC did not constitute an adequate legal basis 
for the adoption of sanctions against individuals (Andersson et al., 2003, 
120; Eckes, 2009; Tridimas and Gutierrez-Fons, 2008–9). Supplementing 
Articles 60 and 301 with Article 308 was not sufficient to allow the EC to 
adopt the regulations either, because Article 308 only concerned situations 
where an objective of the Community was at stake. There was no objective 
of the Community at stake in the case of these asset freezing regulations, as 
their main objective – the attainment of international peace and security – 
was, technically, not an objective of the Community, but one of the EU 
(Andersson et al., 2003, 120; Eckes, 2008, 79). Thus, it is important to note 
that, for several scholars, the EC did not have the competence to adopt these 
regulations organizing asset freezing. This has been implicitly confirmed by 
the drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon. Indeed, this treaty contains two articles 
that have, for the first time, explicitly granted the EU the competence to 
adopt asset freezing measures against individuals (Eckes, 2009, 121–4).11 
7.3 The influence of the UN over the EU’s financial sanctions 
regime
Having examined the development of the EU’s financial sanctions regime 
for counter-terrorism purposes, it is now possible to examine the extent 
to and the ways in which it has been influenced by the UN. One can start 
by observing that, as for the EU, the UN’s role in countering terrorism had 
traditionally been limited prior to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 
2001, mainly as the result of the absence of international consensus on 
a definition of terrorism (Boulden, 2008). The most significant develop-
ment in that period had arguably been the establishment of the ad hoc 
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Committee on Terrorism by the General Assembly in 1996, whose work 
led to the adoption of several terrorism-related Conventions, including the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
in 1999 (Rosand, 2003, 333). Nevertheless, such international instruments 
did not have any significant impact because of the slow pace at which UN 
member states have tended to ratify and implement them (Acharya, 2009; 
Ward, 2003).12 However, this considerably changed in the aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 when ‘the Security Council became 
the focal point of discussions and the forum for the adoption of measures 
against terrorism’ (Bantekas, 2003, 315; see also Dhanapala, 2005). The fol-
lowing analysis of the UN’s influence on the EU’s policy therefore focuses on 
the role of the Security Council in this process. Before proceeding further, it 
is worth recalling that the EU itself is not a member of the UN, while all its 
member states are. In addition, two EU member states, namely France and 
the United Kingdom, belong to the five permanent members of the UNSC, 
where they are joined by other EU member states on a non-permanent, 
rotating basis. 
It can be argued that the influence of the UN on the development of the 
EU’s asset freezing regime has been high. The duality of the EU’s financial 
sanctions regime, which can be divided between the measures that spe-
cifically target the Taliban, Usama Bin Laden and his associates on the one 
hand and the measures targeting terrorists in general on the other, find 
its very origin in and perfectly mirrors the duality of the UN’s financial 
 sanctions regime. 
7.3.1 The influence of UNSC Resolution 133313
With regard to the first dimension of the EU’s asset freezing regime that 
concerns the measures targeting the Taliban and Bin Laden and his associ-
ates (i.e., Al Qaeda), it can be argued that the influence of the UN on the 
EU policy has been particularly high and far-reaching. Indeed, Common 
Position 2001/154/CFSP,14 which provides for the freezing of the funds and 
financial assets of Bin Laden and his associates, has been mainly adopted by 
the EU in order to ensure the implementation of UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 
1333, which notably decided that all UN member states should freeze the 
funds of Usama Bin Laden and individuals and entities associated with 
him and should ensure that no other funds or financial resources should 
be made available to them. This resolution was adopted under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, which meant that its provisions were binding on all UN 
member states.15 Council Common Position 2001/154/CFSP makes numer-
ous references to UNSCR 1333, as well as to the UN Sanctions Committee. 
Article 4 states that ‘[funds] and other financial assets of Usama Bin Laden 
and individuals and entities associated with him as designated by the UN 
Sanctions Committee will be frozen, and funds or other financial resources 
will not be made available to Usama Bin Laden and individuals or entities 
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associated with him as designated by the UN Sanctions Committee, under the 
conditions set out in UNSCR 1333 (2000)’ (emphasis added). Thus, it is remark-
able that the EU asset freezing measures concerning Bin Laden and his asso-
ciates are directly and entirely based on a list drawn up by the UN Sanctions 
Committee, which is accepted by the EU without any amendment. This is a 
case of far-reaching influence of the UN over the EU in the development of 
the financial sanctions that target Bin Laden and his associates. 
Given the importance of the list drawn up by the Sanctions Committee 
for the EU’s financial sanction measures targeting Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, 
it is worthwhile briefly examining this committee and is activities. The 
Sanctions Committee – also known as the ‘1267 Committee’16 – was initially 
established by UNSCR 1267 in 1999. This resolution was a front-runner to 
UNSCR 1333, as it imposed sanctions on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan for 
supporting Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, namely a flight ban and asset freezing 
measures (Rosand, 2004, 747). The committee comprises the 15 members 
of the Security Council (Stromseth, 2003, 41). It was initially tasked with 
monitoring the implementation of the sanctions by UN member states. 
Following the adoption of UNSCR 1333, the committee was also asked to 
draw up and subsequently update the list of individuals and groups associ-
ated with the Taliban, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, whose assets were to be 
frozen. However, in particular at the beginning, the work of the commit-
tee was characterized by a high level of ‘ad hoc-ism’, since it ‘did not even 
have specific standards to guide states in proposing names for designation’ 
(Mendelsohn, 2009, 115). According to Rosand (2004, 748–9),
During the committee’s initial period of work, the creation of the list was 
based largely on political trust (…). [In] practice, submissions of names 
to the 1267 Committee often contained minimal personal information 
and did not generally include explanations of the connection between 
the individual or entity and Osama bin Laden, or members of Al Qaeda 
and the Taliban. This approach was justified by the need to protect secret 
intelligence material and sources, from which the names are usually 
derived, and by the desire to include suspected bad actors on the list as 
soon as possible.
Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the willingness of 
many governments to show their support to the United States in the face 
of the terrorist threat (Rees, 2004, 176; Wilkinson, 2008, 8) led to the inclu-
sion of more than 200 names on the list, most of them following submis-
sions from the United States (Rosand, 2004, p. 749). Among those were 
three Somali-born Swedish citizens, who were allegedly involved with the 
Al Barakaat financing network. After becoming convinced that the men 
had been wrongly listed, the Swedish government managed to negotiate 
the removal of two of them from the 1267 Committee list (Heupel, 2009, 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
9780230314481_08_cha07.indd   118 12/26/2011   11:08:14 AM
PROOF
Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert  119
310). Following this episode, which had highlighted the serious shortcom-
ings stemming from the lack of clear listing and delisting procedures, the 
1267 Committee adopted a set of written guidelines regarding the inclusion 
and removal from the committee’s list in November 2002 (Tappeiner, 2005, 
102). However, although the introduction of written guidelines represented 
an improvement, it is widely considered that the blacklisting procedures 
applied within the 1267 Committee are still affected by several shortcom-
ings, most notably with regard to the respect of human rights standards 
(Almqvist, 2008; Draghici, 2009; Rosand, 2004). 
As explained earlier, these controversies have not prevented the EU from 
taking swift action in order to implement UNSCR 1333. Any subsequent 
changes to the 1267 Committee list of suspected terrorists have been faith-
fully transcribed into Community law. Thus, it has been tacitly accepted 
that the EU should impose sanctions against individuals and entities that 
have been listed by another body, namely the 1267 Committee, in non-
 transparent conditions. Given the controversies surrounding the work of 
the 1267 Committee, this high degree of influence of the UN over this com-
ponent of the EU’s financial sanctions regime is particularly striking. 
7.3.2 The influence of UNSCR 1373
Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 has also 
been adopted by the EU with the specific aim of implementing a UN 
Security Council Resolution, namely UNSCR 1373, which was passed on 
28 September 2001. This resolution, described by Rosand (2003, 333) as the 
‘cornerstone of the United Nations’ counterterrorism effort’, requires all UN 
member states to strengthen various aspects of their counterterrorism poli-
cies, although it actually does not define ‘terrorism’ (Stromseth, 2003, 43). 
As it has been adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the counter-
 terrorism measures that it contains, including CTF measures, are binding 
on all the UN member states. UNSCR 1373 notably declares that all states 
should prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, criminalize activ-
ities aiming to fund terrorism, freeze the resources of terrorists and prevent 
funds being made available to them. It also decided that all member states 
should assist each other in criminal investigations and criminal proceed-
ings relating to the financing of terrorism. Thus, the resolution comprises 
various measures that were hitherto only part of international conventions 
and protocols, such as the Terrorism Financing Convention, which thereby 
became binding on all the members of the UN – rather than just on those 
that had chosen to become parties to these international instruments (Eling, 
2007, 107; Rosand, 2003).17 
According to Talmon (2005, 175), this resolution was ‘hailed as a “ground-
breaking resolution”, a “landmark decision”, a “historic event” and even 
“one of the most important resolutions in [the] history [of the Council]”’ 
by several state representatives on the UNSC. What was remarkable about 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
9780230314481_08_cha07.indd   119 12/26/2011   11:08:14 AM
PROOF
120  Combating the Financing of Terrorism Together?
this resolution was the general and abstract character of the requirements 
imposed upon member states, which has been interpreted by observers as 
a rare example of international law-making by the UNSC. Rather than tak-
ing discrete action targeting a specific state, the Security Council adopted 
requirements that were placed on states for an indefinite number of cases 
and for an indefinite period of time, which is the hallmark of international 
legislation (Talmon, 2005). While some considered this development to 
be positive in the fight against terrorism (see, for example, Szasz, 2002), 
other observers were more circumspect or even critical. They considered 
that the UNSC should not act as a ‘world legislator’ and that its activities 
under Chapter VII should be limited to specific situations (see Alvarez, 2003; 
Olivier, 2004). 
The strong character of the obligations placed upon UN member states was 
also reinforced by the fact that UNSCR 1373 established a Committee tasked 
with the monitoring of the progress of UN member states in implementing 
the resolution (Cortright et al., 2007). This Committee, which is known as 
the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), comprises the 15 members of the 
Security Council and has come to be seen as the ‘core of the Council’s broad 
based counter terrorism strategy’ (Boulden, 2008, 614). The Committee has 
three sub-committees, each of which monitors the progress accomplished by 
a specific group of states in the implementation of their counter-t errorism 
obligations. It is important to note that the main roles of the CTC are to 
monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1373 and to increase the capabili-
ties of states to fight terrorism. It is not a sanctions committee (Dhanapala, 
2005, 19) in the sense that it does not compile lists of terrorist persons or 
entities itself (Tappeiner, 2005, 101). UNSCR 1373 called upon states to 
report on their implementation of the resolution to the CTC within 90 days 
and thereafter according to a timetable to be set by the Committee. In order 
to emphasize the political importance of UNSCR 1373, the EU presented a 
common report on its implementation, alongside the national reports of all 
the EU member states. The report was drafted jointly by the Council and the 
Commission, before being submitted by the Presidency of the Council to the 
Chairman of the CTC in December 2001 (Eling, 2007, 111–12). A second 
joint report was presented to the CTC in August 2002. The EU had no obliga-
tion to do so, as it not a member of the UN, but it aimed to demonstrate its 
commitment to multilateralism and the importance of the role of the UN in 
the ‘War on Terror’, as will be further explained later. 
The fact that the UN was laying down the requirement for all UN member 
states to impose financial sanctions upon suspected terrorists without provid-
ing any lists identifying such individuals presented a significant challenge to 
the EU. Rather than taking over a list of suspected terrorists such as that estab-
lished by the 1267 Committee, it had to autonomously list those that would 
be the target of the financial sanctions (Cameron, 2003; Eling, 2007, 108). 
A new body, described as an ‘ad hoc forum’ (Council, 2007, 1), was established 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
9780230314481_08_cha07.indd   120 12/26/2011   11:08:14 AM
PROOF
Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert  121
for that purpose, the so-called ‘Clearing House’. It comprised representatives 
of the Council Secretariat, the Commission and the member states (Heupel, 
2009, 316) and handled all the preparatory work concerning the listing and 
delisting of individuals, while formal decisions on listing and delisting were 
unanimously adopted by the Council (Heupel, 2009, 316–17). In 2007, it was 
decided to replace the ‘Clearing House’ with a formal Council Working Party, 
namely the ‘Working Party on the implementation of Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism’ 
(also known under the acronym ‘CP 931 WP’) (Council, 2007).
Thus, in the case of the EU’s general financial sanctions regime, one 
can also identify a high degree of influence exercised by the UN. The EU 
has adopted a legislative arsenal and has established new institutional 
 structures – the ‘Clearing House’, later replaced by the CP 931 WP – in order 
to implement UNSCR 1373.
7.4 Explaining the influence of the UN over the EU’s financial 
sanctions regime
As the EU is not a member of the UN and is therefore not itself subject 
to the UNSCRs, from the standpoint of international law, the EU was not 
required to adopt the various common positions and regulations pertaining 
to CFT that have been discussed earlier (Eckes, 2009; Lavranos, 2006, 479). 
In addition, although the European treaties contain some references to the 
UN, it is generally agreed that those are not sufficient to argue that UNSCRs 
have binding force on the EU from the standpoint of European law either 
(Eckes, 2009).18 Even more importantly, as argued earlier, and although the 
European Courts have construed a Community competence for political 
and pragmatic reasons (Eckes, 2009; De Sena and Vitucci, 2009), some legal 
experts have convincingly argued that the Community did not even have 
the legal competence to adopt sanctions against individuals (see, for exam-
ple, Eckes, 2009; Tridimas and Gutierrez-Fons, 2008–9). In other words, the 
EU was neither required nor legally enabled to adopt asset freezing measures 
in order to implement the UNSCRs. 
However, in practice, the Commission and the Council19 showed their 
commitment to implement the UNSCRs at the EU level and efficiently 
worked together to rapidly adopt EU financial sanctions against terrorist 
suspects. In adopting such measures, they enabled the UN to exercise a very 
significant degree of influence over the EU’s own asset freezing policy. There 
are two main factors that account for that outcome: (1) ‘path- dependency’ 
from more traditional sanction measures that had been previously adopted 
by the EU against states and (2) the EU’s declared commitment to multi-
lateralism and international law, which led it to attempt to appear as an 
‘exemplary implementer’ of the UNSCRs concerning sanctions against 
individuals.
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First of all, it can be argued that ‘path-dependency’ from previous EU 
sanction regimes against states can account to a significant extent for the 
EU’s eagerness to adopt the financial sanctions against terrorist suspects 
that have been previously examined in order to implement UNSCRs. ‘Path-
dependency’ refers to the idea that ‘there are self-reinforcing processes in 
institutions that make institutional configurations, and hence their policies, 
difficult to change once a pattern has been established’ (Peters, Pierre and 
King, 2005, 1276; see also Pierson, 2000). In other words, there tends to be 
a replication of institutional configurations, and thereby policy outputs, 
over time (although during ‘formative moments’ new priorities may emerge, 
which will lead to institutional and policy changes). With regard to the case 
examined here, as mentioned before, the EU had developed the practice of 
systematically ‘transcribing’ UNSCRs establishing sanction measures into 
EU instruments (as well as EC instruments for economic sanctions). As Eling 
puts it (2007, 114), ‘[for] the EU, effective implementation of UN Security 
Council resolutions imposing restrictive measures is an article of faith, 
predating 9/11 and, indeed, independent of whether a resolution targets 
terrorist suspects or, say, individuals impeding the peace process in Côte 
d’Ivoire’. In addition to its commitment to multilateralism, one of the main 
reasons for which the EC has consistently implemented the UNSCRs impos-
ing economic and financial sanctions, which traditionally targeted states, is 
the fact that it has exclusive competence with regard to external trade mat-
ters (former Article 133 TEC) (Eling, 2007, 108; Lavranos, 2006, 472). This 
implementation process was even formalized by the Treaty of Maastricht, 
which entered into force in 1993. It introduced a two step-procedure – first, 
the adoption of a common position or joint action on the basis of Article 14 
TEU or Article 15 TEU within the framework of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), before the adoption of operational measures, usually 
in the form of a regulation, on the basis of Article 301 TEC, as well as Article 
60 TEC in the case of financial sanctions (Lavranos, 2006, 472). 
As previously mentioned, institutionalist scholars have argued that policy-
making systems tend to replicate institutional configurations, which leads 
to ‘path-dependencies’. From that viewpoint, although the sanctions estab-
lished by UNSCR 1333 and UNSCR 1373 were qualitatively different in that 
they targeted individuals, rather than states, the EU approached them in the 
same manner as it had approached previous sanction measures adopted by 
the UN and set to implement them in an almost identical fashion. It fol-
lowed the aforementioned two-step procedure that had been established for 
the implementation of UN sanctions against states, with a slight change that 
has been mentioned before, namely the addition of ‘residual competence’ 
Article 308 as a legal basis. In the case of the sanctions against the Taliban, 
Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, path-dependency was strongly facilitated by the 
fact that these sanction measures were initially ‘traditional’ sanction meas-
ures taken against the state of Afghanistan when the Taliban were still in 
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government. Indeed, Common Position 2001/154/CFSP builds upon a series 
of Common Positions, including Common Position 96/746/CFSP concerning 
the imposition of an embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment 
on Afghanistan, which were themselves adopted to implement UNSCRs.
In addition to path-dependency from previous sanction measures against 
states, another important factor accounting for the eagerness of the EU 
to adopt financial sanctions against terrorist suspects in order to imple-
ment the UNSCRs is the EU’s declared commitment to multilateralism and 
international law. This has been stated by the EU on numerous occasions, 
including in the Commission Communication on ‘The European Union 
and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism’ (Commission, 2003), 
which was endorsed by the European Council in December 2003 (Council, 
2004a). The European Security Strategy (European Union, 2003, 9) – a 
highly visible and politically important document – also emphasized the 
commitment of the EU to ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘to upholding and 
developing international law’, while identifying the ‘strengthening of the 
United Nations’ as a ‘European priority’. Therefore, it was important for the 
EU to support the United Nations’ actions against terrorism to reinforce the 
multilateral dimension of the ‘War on Terror’, especially once the United 
States showed increasing signs of unilateralism, in particular with regard to 
military counter-terrorist activities. Also, as a preference for multilateralism 
and a commitment to international law are important elements of the iden-
tity that the EU seeks to project on the international stage (de Búrca, 2010, 
45; Manners, 2002; Manners and Whitman, 1998; Manners and Whitman, 
2003), it was important for the EU to appear as a ‘good implementer’ of 
the UNSCRs concerning the freezing of the assets of terrorist suspects. This 
concern was heightened by the fact that UNSCR 1373 had also established 
the CTC in order to scrutinize the actions taken by UN member states in 
order to implement it. As emphasized by Eling (2007, p. 112), ‘[in] the early 
days of the CTC (…) the possibility of some form of enforcement action by 
the Security Council aiming at those states that did not implement crucial 
provisions of the resolution did not seem entirely far-fetched’, such were the 
political significance and the priority given to UNSCR 1373 by the United 
States and its allies, such as the EU. From that standpoint, the adoption of 
EU financial sanctions in application of the UNSCRs can also be seen as an 
attempt by the EU to assist those member states that did not have any asset 
freezing arrangements in place to ensure that they would meet their obliga-
tions under the UNSCRs (Eling, 2007, 108; Howell and Co, 2007, 28).
7.5 A brake on the UN’s influence over the EU’s financial 
sanction regime: the role of the European courts
While the Commission and the Council – which had successfully pushed 
for the implementation of the UNSCRs at the EU level (see also Kaunert 
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and Della Giovanna, 2010), were priding themselves for the swift develop-
ment of the EU’s financial sanctions for counter-terrorism purposes, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) adopted a more critical stance. The most 
important of its rulings in that respect is that in the appeal decision in Kadi 
(Case C-402/05) and al Barakaat (Case C-415/05) in 2008,20 which followed 
the controversial ruling by the Court of First Instance (CFI)21 in the cases 
of Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation (Case T-306/01) and Kadi 
(T-315/01) in 2005. Mr Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation were 
among the persons and entities who had been placed on one of the EU lists 
of terrorist suspects whose assets should be frozen by the EU member states 
without delay, as a result of their being included in the 1267 Committee 
list of suspected terrorists. It is outside the scope of this chapter to consider 
these various rulings in detail, as they deal with various complex legal issues. 
They have also proved controversial and have given rise to vigorous schol-
arly debates, in particular among law specialists.22 This section only aims to 
examine briefly what the European judicial courts ruled in relation to the 
matter that concerns us in this chapter, namely the influence of the UN over 
the EU in the field of financial sanctions against individuals.
The first point to consider is that both the CFI and the ECJ found the 
Community competent to adopt financial sanctions against individuals 
suspected of involvement in terrorist activities.23 This is significant as, had 
the courts found that the EU did not have the competence to adopt the 
asset freezing regulations examined before, they would have been annulled. 
The UNSCRs would then have had to be implemented by the EU member 
states without any measures being taken at the EU level. This would have 
meant that the UN would no longer have exercised the influence over the 
EU’s financial sanction measures that it has to date. It is interesting to note 
that the CFI and the ECJ ‘construed a Community competence for indi-
vidual sanctions’ in ‘(very) different ways’ (Eckes, 2009, 125). While several 
observers found the reasoning of both European courts on this point rather 
unsound from a legal point of view, it was also acknowledged by some that 
this ‘pragmatism’ had ‘avoided much tension’ and had allowed ‘the [EU] 
political institutions (…) to comply with the necessities of the international 
co-operation in the fight against terrorism’ (Eckes, 2009, 125; see also De 
Sena and Vitucci, 2009).
In contrast, the rulings reveal that both courts were not in agreement on 
the issue of the extent to which the UN should be able to exercise influence 
over the EU. Evidently, the question was not phrased in those terms by the 
CFI and the ECJ, but rather in terms of the relationship between the UN’s 
legal order and the Community’s legal order. While the applicants were 
requesting the annulment of the EC regulations on the freezing of assets 
in so far as they concerned them on the grounds that those breached their 
fundamental rights, the CFI considered that such financial sanction mea-
sures fall outside the scope of judicial review for the most part when they are 
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required by UNSCRs. This was a remarkable stance given that the Court was 
asked to examine a regulation, which is clearly an act of the institutions that 
it is competent to review (Eeckhout, 2007, 184–5). The CFI mainly justified 
its position by arguing that any examination of the internal lawfulness of 
the instruments adopted by the EU to give effect to UNSCRs would amount 
to an evaluation of the UN lists of terrorist suspects, which evidently falls 
outside the scope of the CFI’s jurisdiction. In other words, the CFI affirmed 
that obligations under the UN Charter prevail over European law and that, 
as a matter of principle, Community acts implementing obligations under 
the UN Charter fall outside the scope of the CFI’s jurisdiction.24 Thus, this 
ruling of the CFI confirmed the strong influence of the UN over the EU with 
respect to financial sanctions against individuals. According to the Court, 
the EU does not have any latitude in adopting sanctions against those 
previously identified as suspected terrorists by the 1267 Committee. This 
ruling by the CFI was sharply criticized by legal experts on several grounds, 
including the limitations that it put on the protection of human rights (see 
notably Wessel, 2006). 
It therefore came as no surprise that the ECJ set aside the CFI’s ruling on 
appeal in September 2008. It is not the place to consider in detail the various 
legal points examined in the ruling. The most important point with regard 
to the topic examined in this chapter is that the ECJ ruled that the European 
courts have jurisdiction to review the measures adopted by the Community 
in order to give effect to UNSCRs, such as the regulations concerning finan-
cial sanctions against suspected terrorists. The ECJ emphasized that the 
European courts are competent to review whether any Community measure 
respects fundamental rights. In particular, the ECJ stated in paragraph 285 
of its judgment that
the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the 
effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which 
include the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental 
rights, that respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is 
for the Court to review in the framework of the complete system of legal 
remedies established by the Treaty.
Thus, the ECJ decided to highlight the autonomy of the Community’s legal 
order vis-à-vis the international order. As Nollkaemper (2009, 863) put it, 
‘[the] ECJ positioned itself as a court of a quasi-domestic legal order autono-
mous from the international legal order, and prioritized its constitutional 
rights over the commands of the Security Council’. With regard to the mat-
ter of the influence of the UN over the EU, this ruling evidently aimed to 
limit the UN’s influence by emphasizing that all the instruments adopted to 
implement UNSCRs can be subjected to full review under the human rights 
standards of Community law. This means that, if the European courts find 
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that some of the fundamental rights of a person included in the EU lists 
have been breached, they may25 be removed from these lists. In the case 
of the financial sanctions regime against the Taliban, Usama Bin Laden 
and Al Qaeda, this would therefore lead to a divergence between the 1267 
Committee list of suspected terrorists and that used by the EU. Such a sce-
nario shows that the ECJ ruling has limited the influence that the UN can 
exercise over the EU in the case of the financial sanctions against suspected 
terrorists.
This ECJ judgment has been received with mixed reactions. Some observers 
have welcomed the argument made by the ECJ that a violation of fundamen-
tal rights cannot be justified by the fact that it is caused by measures adopted 
in a wider security context, such as UNSCRs (Halberstam and Stein, 2009; 
Kunoy and Dawes, 2009; Tridimas, 2009). Some have positively received the 
emphasis put by the ECJ on the autonomy and the constitutional character 
of the EC legal order (d’Aspremont and Dopagne, 2008). However, others 
have been more critical of the ruling. Some have criticized the ECJ for, in 
their view, disregarding international law and the UN Charter in particular 
(Goldsmith and Posner, 2008; Hinojosa Martínez, 2008), or at least ‘indulg-
ing in (…) ad hoc, instrumentalist engagement with international law’ 
(de Búrca, 2009, 862). According to de Búrca (2009), in recent years, the 
ECJ has increasingly emphasized the autonomy of the EC’s legal order in 
rulings relating to international relations. In her view (de Búrca, 2010, 49), 
this emphasis on the constitutional nature of the Community’s legal order 
and its separation from the international legal order, including the UN, ‘has 
potentially significant implications for the image the EU has long cultivated 
of itself as an actor which is committed to “effective multilateralism”, pro-
fessing a distinctive allegiance to international law and institutions and seek-
ing to carve out a global role for itself as a normative power’. 
There is little doubt that there will be further judgments by the European 
courts concerning the EU’s financial sanctions against suspected terrorists. 
Those are likely to address some of the doubts that have been expressed as 
to the consistency of the ECJ’s ruling in the Kadi and Al Barakaat cases with 
international law and the European treaties. It is interesting to observe at the 
moment that the ECJ has rejected the idea of allowing the UN to exercise a 
high degree of influence over the EU – as it would have done if it had accepted 
that measures adopted to implement UNSCRs cannot be reviewed in the light 
of fundamental rights. However, this emphasis on judicial review and the 
respect of fundamental rights, which has been welcomed by some, has been 
criticized by others for putting the role of the EU as a ‘good implementer’ of 
UNSCRs into question. Thus, while the Commission and the Council have 
agreed to let the UN exercise a high degree of influence over the EU’s finan-
cial sanctions regime, mainly because of the EU’s pro-multilateralism stance, 
the ECJ has sought to limit the influence of the UN over the EU by reaffirm-
ing the autonomous character of the Community’s legal order. 
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7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the influence exercised by the UN over the devel-
opment of the EU’s financial sanctions against suspected terrorists. It has 
shown that the UN has exercised a high degree of influence over the EU in 
this policy area, especially with regard to the financial sanctions that have 
been imposed upon the Taliban, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. This is particularly 
remarkable given that the UNSCRs concerning financial sanctions against 
suspected terrorists are not directly binding on the EU, as it is not a member 
of the UN, but only on the EU member states. Referring to the theoretical 
framework developed earlier in this book, this can be identified, overall, as 
a case of transformation. This is evidenced by the adoption of a substantial 
number of EU instruments setting up financial sanctions, as well as the 
emergence of new institutional structures, such as the ‘Common Position 
931 Working Party’, which has replaced the more informal ‘Clearing House’. 
This chapter has argued that there have been two main factors accounting 
for the UN’s influence: (1) a path-dependency process from previous state 
sanctions and (2) the EU’s declared commitment to international law and 
multilateralism. It has also been noted that, while the efficient co-opera-
tion between the Commission and the Council to implement the relevant 
UNSCRs has shown their broad acceptance of the UN’s influence in this 
policy area, the ECJ has proved to be significantly less amenable to it. In 
a landmark ruling in the Kadi and Al Barakaat cases, the ECJ has sought to 
limit the influence of the UN over the EU by reaffirming the autonomy of 
the Community’s legal order from the UN’s legal order. From that stand-
point, and again with reference to the theoretical framework underpinning 
this book, it can therefore be argued that the ECJ is engaged in a process 
of retrenchment. Thus, in contrast with the literature that argues that the 
institutions enabled to significantly constrain behaviour are able to exer-
cise a greater degree of influence, as explained in the introductory chapter, 
the present case has shown that strong constraints can actually provoke a 
backlash and a certain degree of resistance to what is perceived as too high 
an influence from an international institution. However, it is important to 
emphasize that the issue of the influence of the UN over the EU’s financial 
sanctions regime is not settled yet and is still characterized by a significant 
level of controversy and uncertainty. It is highly likely that there will be 
other judgments by the European courts regarding the EU’s financial sanc-
tion measures against suspected terrorists. In turn, those will have a signifi-
cant impact on the broader issue of the influence of the UN over the EU.
Notes
1. Money laundering activities and the financing of terrorism are linked, which 
explains why some measures target both challenges at the same time.
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 2. Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose 
of money-laundering and terrorist financing.
 3. The EU has defined ‘terrorism’ in Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 
13 June 2002 on combating terrorism.
 4. Actually, from a technical point of view, the freezing of funds is not a sanction, 
as it is a preventive measure that does not rely upon criminal standards (della 
Cananea, 2009, 514). However, since their inception, asset freezing measures 
have been widely referred to as ‘sanctions’ by national governments, the EU, the 
UN and scholars alike. Therefore, this chapter adopts the same approach and uses 
the term ‘sanction’.
 5. This chapter is strictly concerned with the freezing of assets, which should be 
distinguished from the confiscation of assets. With regard to the confiscation of 
assets, the European Union has adopted two main Framework Decisions. The first 
was Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA on Confiscation of Crime-Related 
Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property, which was adopted on 24 February 
2005 and which stipulates that member states should confiscate ‘either wholly 
or in part, property belonging to a person convicted of an offence (…) which is 
covered by the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on 
combating terrorism’. The second significant Framework Decision was Council 
Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the Application of the 
Principle of Mutual Recognition to Confiscation Orders, which included provi-
sions concerning the execution by a member state of a confiscation order issued 
by a Court of another member state.
 6. It is fully acknowledged that the activities of the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) have also influenced the development of the EU’s CTF policy (see Bures, 
2010). However, it is not possible to include them in the present analysis due to 
space constraints.
 7. The first of these measures called EU member states to sign and ratify the UN 
Convention on the financing of terrorism urgently (measure 26). The second 
called a Joint JHA/ECOFIN Council to rapidly take measures against non-
 cooperative countries and territories identified by the FATF in the light of the 
fight against terrorism (measure 31) (European Council, 2001b).
 8. The EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy is based on four pillars: ‘prevent’, ‘protect’, 
‘pursue’ and ‘respond’. ‘Prevent’ refers to activities aiming to tackle the root 
causes of terrorism, while ‘protect’ concerns activities aiming to decrease the 
vulnerability of people and infrastructures to terrorist attacks. ‘Pursue’ refers to 
the investigation of terrorist activities, while ‘respond’ concerns the reactions to 
terrorist attacks (Council of the European Union, 2005b).
 9. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, which 
established the EU, there used to be three so-called pillars, namely the EC or 
‘Community’ pillar for matters related to the single market, the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar for foreign and external security matters, and the 
Justice and Home Affaire (JHA) pillar for internal security matters. The EC had 
legal personality, whereas the EU did not. The Treaty of Lisbon abolished the 
three-pillar structure of the EU (and thereby the EC). Only the EU remains now, 
which has also been granted legal personality. For the sake of simplicity, this 
chapter generally refers to the EU, unless it is necessary to distinguish between 
the EC and the EU for technical reasons.
10. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1285/2009 of 22 December 2009 
implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive 
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measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating 
terrorism and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 501/2009.
11. Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (which 
replaces Article 301 TEC) constitutes the legal basis for the financial sanctions against 
individuals that have been placed on UN lists, such as the list drawn up by the 1267 
Committee, while Article 75 TFEU (which replaces Article 60 TEC) provides a legal 
basis for the sanctions against individuals that are autonomously listed by the EU.
12. For example, according to Ward (2003), only two states – Botswana and the 
United Kingdom – had ratified all 12 international instruments aiming to combat 
terrorism by the time of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. 
13. Other UNSCRs, such as UNSCRs 1390 and 1455, subsequently confirmed that the 
freezing of the assets of the Taliban, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda should be contin-
ued. However, UNSCR 1333 is the most important as it established the financial 
sanction measures against Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.
14. This common position complements previous common positions setting out 
restrictive measures against the Taliban, such as Common Position 96/746/CFSP 
and Common Position 1999/727/CFSP.
15. UNSCRs adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are binding on all mem-
bers of the UN. States are able to determine how to implement the measures 
adopted by the Security Council, but are not free to determine whether (or not) 
they implement such measures according to Article 25 of the UN Charter.
16. Its full name is ‘the UN Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
Resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and associated 
individuals and entities’.
17. However, it is interesting to note that, while this resolution reiterated some of the 
provisions that were part of the previously adopted United Nations International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, it ‘omitted other 
portions of the Convention (such as the explicit reference to other requirements 
of international law, including the rights due to persons charged with terrorism-
related offences, the rights of extradited persons, the requisites of international 
humanitarian law, and the provisions on judicial dispute settlement)’ (Alvarez, 
2003, 875).
18. However, some scholars disagree on that point. For example, Wessel (2006, 2) 
claims that ‘irrespective of the fact that the Community is not a member of the 
United Nations and, hence, not directly bound by the UN Charter, it is ‘indi-
rectly’ bound by the UN law as in its constituting treaty it has taken over some of 
its Member States’ international competences’. See also Hinojosa Martínez (2008, 
340) and Halberstam and Stein (2009).
19. The European Parliament did not play any significant role in the development of 
the EU’s financial sanctions regime, which reflected its marginal position in the 
CFSP pillar at the time (Eling, 2007; Peers, 2003).
20. Judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-415/05, 3 
September 2008.
21. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU’s judicial authority has 
been called the ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’ and consists of the Court 
of Justice and the General Court. However, prior to 1 December 2009, the Court 
of Justice was officially called the ‘Court of Justice of the European Communities’ 
(or the ‘Court of Justice’), but was often referred to as the ‘European Court of 
Justice’ (ECJ), while the General Court was known as the ‘Court of First Instance’ 
(CFI). The Court of Justice was responsible for considering the appeals against 
judgments of the CFI. As the overwhelming majority of the literature on the EU’s 
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financial sanctions regime refers to the ECJ and the CFI, this chapter also uses 
these acronyms for the sake of clarity.
22. See notably Eeckhout, 2007; Curtin and Eckes, 2008; Hinojosa Martínez, 2008; 
d’Aspremont and Dopagne, 2008; de Búrca, 2010; della Cananea, 2008–9; De 
Sena and Vitucci, 2009; Eckes, 2008, 2009; Halberstam and Stein, 2009; Kunoy 
and Dawes, 2009; Nettesheim, 2007; Tridimas, 2009; Tridimas and Gutierrez-
Fons, 2008–9; van den Herik and Schrijver, 2008; Wessel, 2008; and Vlcek, 
2007.
23. For its part, the European Commission submitted that it was necessary to adopt 
EU instruments to ensure a consistent application of the targeted sanctions 
across the EU territory in order to preserve the free movement of capital within 
the Community and to avoid distortions of competition. This reasoning was 
also strongly supported by some member states, such as the United Kingdom, 
which feared that differences in the application of the freezing of assets among 
member states would have an impact on free movement of capital in the EU, 
therefore leading to a risk of distortion of competition (see Judgment of the Court 
of First Instance, in Case T-315/01, 21 September 2005, paragraphs 73 and 80 in 
 particular). 
24. Nevertheless, in paragraph 277 of the judgment, the Court softened this strong 
stance by declaring itself ‘empowered to check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the 
resolution of the Security Council in question with regard to jus cogens, under-
stood as a body of higher rules of public international law binding on all subjects 
of international law, including the bodies of the United Nations, and from which 
no derogation is possible’.
25. ‘May’ is used on the basis of Mr Kadi’s practical experience. Following the ECJ rul-
ing in September 2008, which had annulled the regulation freezing his funds, the 
European Commission informed Mr Kadi of the reasons for which he had been 
listed by the UN 1267 Committee and subsequently adopted a new regulation 
maintaining the freezing of his funds. The Commission stated that it had com-
plied with the judgment of the ECJ by communicating to Mr Kadi the reasons for 
his listing and granting him an opportunity to comment on these reasons.
References
Acharya, A. (2009), Targeting Terrorist Financing: International Cooperation and New 
Regimes (London: Routledge).
Almqvist, J. (2008), ‘A Human Rights Critique of European Judicial Review: Counter-
terrorism Sanctions’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 57, 303–31.
Alvarez, J. E. (2003), ‘Hegemonic International Law Revisited’, The American Journal of 
International Law, 97(4), 873–88.
Argomaniz, J. E (2009), ‘Post-9/11 Institutionalisation of European Union Counter-
terrorism: Emergence, Acceleration and Inertia’, European Security, 18(2), 151–72.
Bantekas, I. (2003), ‘The International Law of Terrorist Financing’, The American 
Journal of International Law, 97(2), 315–33.
Biersteker, T. J. and Romaniuk, P. (2004), ‘The Return of the State? Financial 
Reregulation in the Pursuit of National Security after September 11’, in J. Tirman 
(ed.) The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration after 9/11 (New York: The New Press).
Biersteker, T. J., Eckert, S. E., and Romaniuk, P. (2008), ‘International Initiatives 
to Combat the Financing of Terrorism’ in T.J. Biersteker and S. E. Eckert (eds) 
Countering the Financing of Terrorism (London: Routledge).
AQ5
AQ6
AQ7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
9780230314481_08_cha07.indd   130 12/26/2011   11:08:15 AM
PROOF
Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert  131
Boulden, J. (2008), ‘The Security Council and Terrorism’, in V. Lowe, A. Roberts, 
J. Welsh and D. Zaum (eds) The United Nations Security Council and War: The 
Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Bures, O. (2010), ‘EU’s Fight against Terrorist Finances: Internal Shortcomings and 
Unsuitable External Models’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22, 418–37.
Cameron, I. (2003), ‘European Union Anti-terrorist Blacklisting’, Human Rights Law 
Review, 3, 225–56.
Cameron, I., Andersson, T. and Nordback, K. (2003), ‘EU Blacklisting: The Renaissance 
of Imperial Power, but on a Global Scale’, European Business Law Review, 14(2), 
111–41.
Clunan, A. L. (2007), ‘U.S. and International Responses to Terrorist Financing’, 
in J. K. Giraldo and H. A. Trinkunas (eds) Terrorism Financing and State Response 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press).
Commission (2003), Communication of the European Commission to the Council and TO 
the European Parliament. The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of 
Multilateralism, COM 2003 (526), 10 September 2003.
Cortright, D. and Lopez, G. A. (eds) (2007), Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative 
Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Cortright, D., Lopez, G. A., Millar, A. and Gerber-Stellingwerf, L (2007), ‘Global 
Cooperation against Terrorism: Evaluating the United Nations Counter-Terrorism 
Committee’, in D. Cortright and G. A. Lopez (eds.) Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative 
Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Council (2001), Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on combating terror-
ism (2001/930/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities L 344/90, 28 
December 2001.
Council (2004a), Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 12–13 
December 2003, Doc. 5381/04, 5 February 2004.
Council (2004b), EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism, Doc. 10586/04, 15 June 
2004.
Council (2005a), Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 16–17 
December 2005, Doc.16238/1/04 REV 1, 1 February 2005.
Council (2005b), The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Doc. 14469/4/05, 30 
November 2005.
Council (2007), ‘I’ Item Note: Fight against the Financing of Terrorism – Implementation of 
Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, Doc. 10826/07, 21 June 2007.
Council (2008), Revised Strategy on Terrorist Financing, Doc. 11778/1/08 REV 1, 17 July 
2008.
Curtin, D. and Eckes, C. (2008), ‘The Kadi Case: Mapping the Boundaries between 
the Executive and the Judiciary in Europe’, International Organizations Law Review, 
5, 365–9.
D’Aspremont, J. and Dopagne, F. (2008), ‘Kadi: The ECJ’s Reminder of the Elementary 
Divide between Legal Orders’, International Organizational Law Review, 5, 371–9.
De Búrca, G. (2009), ‘The European Courts and the Security Council: Between 
Dédoublement Fonctionnel and Balancing of Values: Three Replies to Pasquale De 
Sena and Maria Chiara Vitucci’, The European Journal of International Law, 20(3), 
853–62.
De Búrca, G. (2010), ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order 
after Kadi’, Harvard International Law Journal, 51(1), 1–49.
De Sena, P. and Vitucci, M. C. (2009), ‘The European Courts and the Security Council: 
Between “Dédoublement Fonctionnnel” and the Balancing of Values’, The European 
Journal of International Law, 20(1), 193–228.
AQ8
AQ9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
9780230314481_08_cha07.indd   131 12/26/2011   11:08:15 AM
PROOF
132  Combating the Financing of Terrorism Together?
Della Cananea, G. (2009), ‘Global Security and Procedural Due Process of Law 
between the United Nations and the European Union: Yassin Abdullah Kadi and 
Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council’, Columbia Journal of European Law, 
15(3), 511–30.
Dhanapala, J. (2005), ‘The United Nations’ Response to 9/11’, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 17, 17–23.
Draghici, C. (2009), ‘International Organisations and Anti-Terrorist Sanctions: No 
Accountability for Human Rights Violations?’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2(2), 
293–312.
Eckes, C. (2008), ‘Judicial Review of European Anti-Terrorism Measures: The Yusuf and 
Kadi Judgments of the Court of First Instance’, European Law Journal, 14(1): 74–92.
Eckes, C. (2009), EU Counter-terrorist Policies and Fundamental Rights: The Case 
of Individual Sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Eeckhout, P. (2007), 
‘Community Terrorism Listings, Fundamental Rights, and UN Security Council 
Resolutions. In Search of the Right Fit’, European Constitutional Law Review, 3, 
183–206.
Eling, K. (2007), ‘The EU, Terrorism and Effective Multilateralism’, in D. Spence (ed.) 
The European Union and Terrorism (London: John Harper).
European Council (2001a), Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European 
Council Meeting on 21 September 2001, 21 September 2001. Doc. SN 140/01.
European Council (2001b), Anti-Terrorism Roadmap, 26 September 2001. Doc. SN 
4019/01.
European Council (2004), Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 25 March 2005, 
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/79637.pdf, accessed 1 September 2010.
European Parliament (2009), Overview of European and International Legislation on 
Terrorist Financing, Study. Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies, Policy Department C.
Flynn, E. J. (2007), ‘The Security Council’s Counter-terrorism Committee and Human 
Rights’, Human Rights Law Review, 7(2), 371–84.
Foot, R. (2007), ‘The United Nations, Counter Terrorism, and Human Rights: 
Institutional Adaptation and Embedded Ideas’, Human Rights Quarterly, 29(2), 
489–514.
Gardner, K. L. (2007), ‘Terrorism Defanged: The Financial Action Task Force and 
International Efforts to Capture Terrorist Finances’, in D. Cortright and G. A. Lopez 
(eds) Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist 
Threat (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Goldsmith, J. and Posner, E. (2008), ‘Does Europe Believe in International Law?’, The 
Wall Street Journal, 25 November 2008.
Guild, E. (2008), ‘The Uses and Abuses of Counter-Terrorism Policies in Europe: The 
Case of the “Terrorist Lists”’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(1), 173–93.
Halberstam, D. and Stein, E. (2009), ‘The United Nations, the European Union, and 
the King of Sweden: Economic Sanctions and Individual Rights in a Plural World 
Order’, Common Market Law Review, 46, 13–72.
Heng, Y.-K. and McDonagh, K. (2008), ‘The Other War on Terror Revealed: Global 
Governmentality and the Financial Action Task Force’s Campaign Against Terrorist 
Financing’, Review of International Studies, 34, 553–73.
Heupel, M. (2009), ‘Multilateral Sanctions against Terror Suspects and the Violation 
of Due Process Standards’, International Affairs, 85(2), 307–21.
Hinojosa Martínez, L. M. (2008), ‘Bad Law for Good Reasons: The Contradictions of 
the Kadi Judgment’, International Organizations Law Review, 5, 339–57.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
9780230314481_08_cha07.indd   132 12/26/2011   11:08:15 AM
PROOF
Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert  133
Howell, J. and Co. (2007), Independent Scrutiny: The EU’s Efforts in the Fight against 
Terrorist Financing in the Context of the Financial Action Task Force’s Nine Special 
Recommendations and the EU Counter Terrorist Financing Strategy, Report ordered by 
the European Commission, 1 February 2007.
Kaunert, C. (2007), ‘“Without the Power of Purse or Sword”: The European Arrest Warrant 
and the Role of the Commission’, Journal of European Integration, 29(4), 387–404.
Kaunert, C. (2010a), ‘The External Dimension of EU Counter-terrorism Relations: 
Competences, Interests and Institutions’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22(1), 41–61.
Kaunert, C. (2010b), ‘Europol and EU Counter-terrorism: International Security 
Actorness in the External Dimension?’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33(7), 
652–71.
Kaunert, C. and Della Giovanna, M. (2010), ‘Post 9/11 EU Counter-terrorist 
Financing Cooperation: Differentiating Supranational Policy Entrepreneurship by 
the Commission and the Council Secretariat’, European Security, 19(2), 275–95.
Kunoy, B. and Dawes, A. (2009), ‘Plate Tectonics in Luxembourg: The Ménage à Trois 
Between EC Law, International Law and the European Convention on Human Rights 
Following the UN Sanctions Cases’, Common Market Law Review, 46, 73–104.
Lavranos, N. (2006), ‘Judicial Review of UN Sanctions by the Court of First Instance’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, 11, 471–90.
Manners, I. (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235–58.
Manners, I. and Whitman, R. (1998), ‘Towards Identifying the International Identity 
of the European Union: A Framework for Analysis of the European Union’s Network 
of Relations’, Journal of European Integration, 21(2), 231–49.
Manners, I. and Whitman, R. (2003), ‘The “Difference Engine”: Constructing and 
Representing the International Identity of the European Union’, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 10(3), 380–404.
Mendelsohn, B. (2009), Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony and Interstate 
Cooperation in the War on Terrorism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).
Nettesheim, M. (2007), ‘UN Sanctions Against Individuals: A Challenge to the 
Architecture of European Union Governance’, Common Market Law Review, 44, 
567–600.
Nollkaemper, A. (2008), ‘The European Courts and the Security Council: Between 
“Dédoublement Fonctionnnel” and the Balancing of Values: – Three Replies to 
Pasquale De Sena and Maria Chiara Vitucci’, European Journal of International Law, 
20(3), 853–87.
Olivier, C. (2004), ‘Human Rights Law and International Fight against Terrorism: Could 
Security Council Regulations Impact on States’ Obligations under International 
Human Rights Law?’, Nordic Journal of International Law, 73(4), 399–419.
Peers, S. (2003), ‘EU Responses to Terrorism’, International Comparative Law Quarterly, 
52, 227–43.
Pierson, P. (2000), ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics’, 
American Political Science Review, 94(1), 251–66.
Rees, W. (2004), ‘Combating Terrorism in Transatlantic Relations’, in D. Mahncke, 
W. Rees and W. C. Thompson (eds) Redefining Transatlantic Security Relations: The 
Challenge of Change (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
Richard, A. C. (2005), Fighting Terrorist Financing: Transatlantic Cooperation and 
International Institutions (Washington, DC: Centre for Transatlantic Relations, The 
John Hopkins University).
Romaniuk, P. (2010), Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation 
and Contestation (London: Routledge).
AQ101
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
9780230314481_08_cha07.indd   133 12/26/2011   11:08:15 AM
PROOF
134  Combating the Financing of Terrorism Together?
Rosand, E. (2003), ‘Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-terrorism 
Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism’, The American Journal of International 
Law, 97(2), 333–41.
Rosand, E. (2004), ‘The Security Council’s Efforts to Monitor the Implementation 
of Al Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions’, The American Journal of International Law, 98(4), 
745–63.
Spence, D. (2007), The European Union and Terrorism (London: John Harper).
Stromseth, J. E. (2003), ‘The Security Council’s Counter-terrorism Role: Continuity 
and Innovation’, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 97, 41–5.
Szasz, P. C. (2002), ‘Notes and Comments: The Security Council Starts Legislating’, The 
American Journal of International Law, 96(4), 901–5.
Talmon, S. (2005), ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’, The American Journal of 
International Law, 97(4), 873–88.
Tappeiner, I. (2005), ‘The Fight Against Terrorism: The Lists and the Gaps’, Utrecht Law 
Review, 1(1), 97–125.
Tridimas, T. (2009), ‘Terrorism and the ECJ: Empowerment and Democracy in the EC 
Legal Order’, European Law Review, 34(1), 103–26.
Tridimas, T. and Gutierrez-Fons, J. A. (2008–9), ‘EU Law, International Law, and 
Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress?’, Fordham 
International Law Journal, 32, 660–730.
United Nations Security Council (1999), Resolution 1267 (1999), 15 October 1999. 
Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999).
United Nations Security Council (2001a), Resolution 1373 (2001), 28 September 2001. 
Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
Van den Herik, L. J. (2007), ‘The Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In 
Need of Better Protection for the Individual’, Leiden Journal for International Law, 
20, 69–79. 
Van den Herik, L. J. and Schrijver, N. (2008), ‘Eroding the Primacy of the UN System 
of Collective Security: The Judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Cases 
of Kadi and Al Barakaat’, International Organizations Law Review, 5, 329–38.
Van Thiel, S. (2008), ‘UN Anti-terrorism Sanctions and EU Human Rights: The Lessons 
of European Integration’, in B. Martenczuk and S. Van Thiel (eds) Justice, Liberty, 
Security: New Challenges for EU External Relations (Brussels: VUB Press/Brussels 
University Press).
Vlcek, W. (2006), ‘Acts to Combat the Financing of Terrorism: Common Foreign and 
Security Policy at the European Court of Justice’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 
11, 491–507.
Vlcek, W. (2009), ‘Hitting the Right Target: EU and Security Council Pursuit of 
Terrorist Financing’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2(2), 275–91.
Ward, C. A. (2003), ‘Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role 
of the United Nations Security Council’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 8(2), 
289–305.
Weiss, T. G. and Boulden, J. (eds) (2004), Terrorism and the UN: Before and After 
September 11 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
Wessel, R. A. (2006), ‘Editorial: The UN, the EU and Jus Cogens’, International 
Organizations Law Review, 3(1), 1–6. 
Wessel, R. A. (2008), ‘The Kadi Case: Towards a More Substantive Hierarchy in 
International Law?’, International Organizations Law Review, 5, 323–7.
Wilkinson, P. (2008), ‘Using Criminal Justice to Foster US-EU Cooperation on 
Counter-terrorism’, The International Spectator, 43(4), 7–17.
AQ11
AQ12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
9780230314481_08_cha07.indd   134 12/26/2011   11:08:15 AM
PROOF
Query Form
Book Title: Costa
Chapter No: Chapter 7
Queries and / or remarks
Query No. Query / remark Response
AQ1 Is it <Biersteker and Romaniuk>? Please check.
AQ2 Andersson et al. not listed in the references. 
Please check.
AQ3 Peters, Pierre and King not listed in the refer-
ences. Please check.
AQ4 Listed only under 2008 in the references. 
Please check.
AQ5 Listed only under 2009. Please check.
AQ6 No entry for Vlcek 2007. Please check.>
AQ7 Not cited in the chapter. Please check.
AQ8 Which Commission is this?
AQ9 Which council is being referred to here?
AQ10 The other authors need to be named. If they 
cannot be named, change ‘and Co.’ to ‘et al.’
AQ11 This entry and the next have not been cited in 
the text. Please check.
AQ12 Not cited in the chapter. Please check.
9780230314481_08_cha07.indd   135 12/26/2011   11:08:15 AM
PROOF
